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There may be some advantages in a treatise composed, not by a professed oriental 
scholar, but by one who looks at Eastern history with Western eyes, and who is therefore 
naturally inclined to give most attention to those parts of his subject which, in the way 
either of connexion or contrast, possess some bearing upon the history of the West. 
(E.A. Freeman, The History and Conquests of the Saracens (1856))1 
 
E.A. Freeman (1823–1892) was a historian whose work focused primarily on the 
West. His magnum opus was the gargantuan History of the Norman Conquest (six 
volumes, 1867–1879) and he dedicated 14 works to the history of Britain and the 
Continent. Understandably, modern scholars have focused on Freeman’s panegyrics 
to England’s ancient constitution and his specifically mid-Victorian belief that the 
common political institutions of European nations proved their shared Aryan 
descent. This article acknowledges the significance of Freeman’s writings on the 
West but maintains that they form only one part of a wider intellectual project that 
has been overlooked because his writings on the East languish in near-perfect 
obscurity.2 
The understanding of Freeman as a confident proponent of the superiority of the 
Aryan race demands revision in light of an analysis of his two neglected volumes on 
the Orient: The History and Conquests of the Saracens (1856) and The Ottoman Power 
in Europe (1877). The best recent studies of Freeman, those of John Burrow and Peter 
Mandler, have focused on his attempt to combine a traditional Whig narrative on 
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 English liberty with new ideas about Western racial characteristics and have presented 
Freeman as at once ‘the most Whiggish of all’ mid-Victorian historians, and ‘the 
greatest nationalist historian of the nineteenth century’.3   Hugh MacDougall and 
C.J.W. Parker, by comparison, have emphasized Freeman’s hierarchic ordering of the 
Aryan nations and ‘intemperate distaste’ for non-Aryans and have concluded that his 
works demonstrate the ‘failure of liberal racialism’ and stand on the ‘extreme limits of 
racism’.4 From a different perspective, Rosemary Jann and Susan Walton have 
examined the difficulties Freeman faced as a gentleman scholar who held no 
professional post for most of his career and who allowed his racial prejudices to 
influence his work at a time when the writing of history was becoming self- 
consciously ‘scientific’, objective and located within the Academy.5 While Freeman’s 
conception of history was undoubtedly based on the idea of the unity and progress of 
the Aryan nations, scrutiny of his Oriental volumes suggests that he did not believe in 
fixed or inherent characteristics. In these works, Christianity emerges as central to 
Freeman’s view of the West as an unstable community of culture which was far from 
guaranteed a place of continued pre-eminence in the modern world. 
This article uses the insights of scholarship on Western approaches to the Orient 
to examine Freeman’s Saracens and Ottoman Power. First, Edward W. Said’s 
argument in Orientalism (1978) that the West always exploits the East according to 
contemporary exigency and consistently represents the Orient as ‘other’ can 
illuminate Freeman’s motives in producing the volumes on the East and constituting 
the Orient in relation to Europe.  Composed in response to Britain’s support of the 
Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War (1853–1856) and Great Eastern Crisis 
(1875–1878), Freeman drew on well established discourses of ‘otherness’ to represent 
purposefully the Orient as distinct from, and inferior to, the West. Here I 
demonstrate that, in the context of the Eastern Question, Freeman associated 
Christianity with Western progress and expressed fierce hostility towards the non- 
Christian world. Moving on to a detailed analysis of Freeman’s representation of the 
East as ‘other’, this analysis challenges scholarship which suggests that the Victorians 
produced increasingly positive and objective reappraisals of Islam.6 While there were 
various views of Islam in circulation by the mid-Victorian period, Freeman retained a 
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‘traditional’ and ‘confrontational’ attitude towards the rival faith as a creed which he 
believed accounted for the barbarism of the East. Finally, this article considers 
Freeman’s view of Euro-Christendom as a cultural community struggling against the 
encroachments of the Muslim world. While it has been assumed that Orientalist 
discourses empower the West and are associated with Imperialism, Freeman’s 
narratives on the Orient focus on the threat posed by the presence of Orientals within 
the bounds of Christendom and culminate in demands that the Turkish ‘other’ be 
removed from, rather than dominated, by Europe.7 Freeman was not a confident 
believer in the unhindered and inevitable progress of the Aryan race. In the Oriental 
volumes, history emerges as the record of dangerous political power struggles 
between fundamentally incompatible civilizations; an ‘old internecine war between 
the East and the West, between despotism and freedom, between a progressive and a 
stationary social state’.8 
 
1. Freeman’s Oriental ‘other’ 
The publication of Edward Said’s seminal Orientalism (1978) stimulated critical 
analyses of Western approaches to the Orient. In Orientalism Said argues that 
European writing on the Orient has always assumed a basic distinction between East 
and West and made reductive statements about the Orient.9 In Said’s analysis, the 
distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’ was initially based on religious categories while, 
in the eighteenth century, the binary opposition was restructured and accommodated 
to secular theories of human differentiation. In particular, writes Said, ‘theses of 
Oriental backwardness, degeneracy, and inequality with the West most easily 
associated themselves . . . with ideas about the biological bases of racial inequality’.10 
Crucially, according to Said, modern Orientalism was characterized by a reinforced, 
expanded and increasingly secure, Eurocentric perspective. The professional 
Orientalist emerged whose works established an authoritative discourse on the 
weakness and inferiority of the Orient and raised the level of its assertions to ‘truths’. 
In Said’s view, this discourse not only excluded a potential dialogue between the 
Orient and the Occident but also prevented the articulation by Europeans of disparate 
views on the East. While Western culture had always, implicitly or explicitly, 
accepted the ‘otherness’ of the East, the establishment of modern Orientalism was 
accompanied by a more aggressive mode in thought and action which  meant  that  it  
was  easily  implicated  in  the  West’s  political   and   material  domination   of   the 
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 non-Western world. According to Said, as ‘European culture gained in strength and 
identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even 
underground self’, the hegemony of the West over the East was established, and 
European imperial power gained its rationale.11  In  short, Orientalism became a 
‘style for dominating,  restructuring,  and  having authority over the Orient’.12 
The debate between Said and his critics is voluminous but three points of 
discussion are important in assessing Freeman’s motivation and methodology in 
representing the Orient as ‘other’. Each of these criticisms focuses, in various ways, 
on the reductionism and ahistoricism of Said’s analysis, which arises from the use he 
makes of the work of Michel Foucault. Foucault showed that ideas about human 
nature and society, often taken to be fixed truths, change in the course of history and 
that these shifting discourses determine the way the world is interpreted or 
experienced.13 While Foucault acknowledged that both statements and the meaning 
of an object itself fluctuate in space and time, Said argued that statements about the 
Orient in the West refer to a single object and its allegedly eternal nature and that this 
discourse is preserved indefinitely for the purpose of dominating the Orient.14 The 
first criticism, advanced by Aijaz Ahmad and James Clifford among others, is that 
Said wrongly assumes that there is one monolithic Western discourse which affirms 
itself against the subjugated Eastern ‘other’.15 As Ali Behdad, Lisa Lowe and Ussama 
Makdisi have demonstrated, European representations of the Orient have varied 
according to the context in which they were produced, Europeans have not always 
viewed the East as inferior to the West, and there is no absolute demarcation between 
the complex discourses on the Orient articulated by Europeans and the equally 
complex discourses on the Orient articulated by colonial peoples themselves.16 On a 
second and related point, Javed Majeed and Gyan Prakash claim that Said fails to 
consider authorial intentions, the role of individual conceptual frameworks, tools, 
techniques of investigation, and the availability of information, in the production of 
Orientalist texts.17 Finally, some scholars have been concerned with the validity of the 
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fundamental theoretical assumption on which Orientalism is based. Keith Wind- 
schuttle questioned Said’s proposition that societies need an ‘alter-ego’ and 
contended that Europeans draw on their own heritage rather than on comparisons 
with barbarian others when defining their self-identity.18 
Said denies that he was a proponent of a monolithic rendering that did not 
account for communication between the Occidental and Oriental and, in his later 
writings, emphasizes the ‘overlapping experience of Westerners and Orientals and the 
interdependence of cultural terrains in which colonizer and colonized co-existed and 
battled with each other’.19 Nevertheless, Said continued to stress the dominance of a 
unified Western discourse on Eastern ‘otherness’ and to de-emphasize the 
heterogeneity of different kinds of European representation of the East. It is therefore 
necessary to adapt and extend Said’s thesis in the following ways. By 
acknowledging the persistent problem of ahistoricism in Said’s account, I pay specific 
attention to the context in which Freeman composed his works and to the 
preconceived objects with which he approached the task. Thereafter, I employ Said’s 
idea that the West exploits a reduced model of the East according to the needs of the 
Occident to illuminate Freeman’s political motives in representing the Orient as 
‘other’ in the context of the Eastern Question. In order to avoid Said’s tendency to 
conflate disparate texts into one unified discourse, my discussion then turns to the 
sources available to Freeman and the use which he made of them. Said’s assertion 
that Western writers are reliant on a well-established and authoritative discourse on 
the Orient is then used to explain Freeman’s methodological neglect of primary 
Oriental sources. Once we acknowledge that Freeman’s understanding of the Euro- 
Christian past did inform his conception of Western identity, then Said’s insight into 
the European need for an ‘other’ remains invaluable. In the Oriental volumes, 
Freeman’s strong sense of European self-identity is powerfully reinforced through 
contrast with the East. 
By placing Freeman’s Oriental volumes in historical context, it becomes clear that 
Said’s idea that the West exploits the East according to practical exigencies can 
illuminate the motivation with which they were composed. Freeman wrote his works 
in direct response to Britain’s periodic involvement in the Eastern Question, a 
problem that concerned the future of territories encompassed within the crumbling 
Ottoman Empire.20 From the 1830s onwards Britain had been locked in a power 
struggle with Russia because, while Britain sought to maintain the integrity of the 
Empire, Russia had grievances over territory and trade and felt a natural sympathy 
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with Orthodox Christians living under Muslim rule. When, in May 1853, Russia 
demanded that the position of Christians within the Ottoman Empire be guaranteed, 
a Russo-Turkish war that would implicate Britain became inevitable. In demanding 
the right to protect Orthodox laymen under Turkish rule, Russia demanded, in effect, 
the right to intervene in the Empire’s internal affairs. War was declared on 15 
November 1853, and on 12 March 1854 Britain committed itself to the defence of 
Ottoman Empire. Freeman had taken an active interest in the Crimean War from the 
beginning.21 Initially, he held that British support for the Turk was justified in order 
to save the European subjects from falling under the yoke of a stronger Russian 
despotism.22 After the Conference of Vienna, however, when pacific overtures from 
Russia were rejected, Freeman decided that the war was no longer a war in defence of 
Turkey but one of aggression against Russia, because Russia would not guarantee the 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The insistence on such a guarantee, he claimed, was 
an act of deliberate ‘wickedness’ for it meant a guarantee to perpetuate the Turk’s 
oppression of his European subjects.23 If only the history of the East was considered, 
it would be clear that Islam posed an ineradicable barrier to the improvement of 
Turkish rule in Europe. In the Saracens, Freeman exploited Oriental history to prove 
that British policy in the East was misguided. 
Two decades following the end of the Crimean War the Great Eastern Crisis 
began with the Slav revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1875. The British 
Government, under Benjamin Disraeli, encouraged the Ottomans to suppress the 
insurrections and, in May 1876, news broke of the Turkish massacre of 15,000 
Bulgarians.24 Rumours of the atrocities caused Russia to enter the war in defence of 
the rebels in April 1877, raising the prospect of a conflict that would involve Britain. 
As Jonathan Parry has noted, Disraeli’s continued support of the Ottoman Empire 
was part of his policy of protecting routes to  British  India  and  an expression of 
his commitment to the empire which was crucial if the language of patriotism 
was to be ‘stolen’ from Palmerstonian Liberalism for the Conservative party.25 
Whatever Disraeli’s motives, he mishandled the Eastern Crisis disastrously. Liberals 
such as Freeman and Gladstone denounced Disraeli’s support of Turkey as 
demonstrative of the stagnation, elitism and Oriental  sympathies  of  the 
Conservative government.26 The Liberal charge that Disraeli had sacrificed 
humanitarian   sentiment,   earnestness   of   principle,   and   commitment   to      the 
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constitutional principle of self-government, to further his own ambitions  spoke 
loudly to the British   public.27 
Freeman condemned Disraeli’s foreign policy and described it as ‘unrighteous’, ‘a 
moral crime’ and ‘the greatest of evils’.28 His support for the revolt was intensified by 
correspondence with eye-witnesses to the ‘intolerable wrongs’ and ‘frightful cruelties’ 
perpetrated by the Turks.29 Adelaine Irby, working among Slav refugees, reported to 
Freeman that the Turks ‘are just now beginning to set up crosses to crucify the 
Christians alive’, that they were going through ‘the villages robbing and plundering’ 
and ‘shamefully ill-treating’ the wives of murdered men.30 Similarly, Dr Humphrey 
Sandwith, stationed in Belgrade, reported on the ‘violation of women, of people 
roasted alive and the flesh of children thrust into the mouths of peasants etc’.31 
Sandwith drew a colourful picture of the fearful barbarity of the Turks: 
 
I am witnessing scenes such as I have read of in the bloody records of the middle ages, 
and I ask myself if I am really living in the nineteenth century . . . I hear stories of deeds 
almost too foul and hideous to repeat [of a young girl]. Outrages, dishonour and 
brutality of the foulest kind were not enough, her ravishers actually cut out large strips 
of skin and flesh from her back and left her frightfully mutilated. She was found some 
hours afterwards by Servian [Serbian] troops and they gently carried her into one of the 
field hospitals where she lingered four days and quietly died.32 
 
Freeman publicly insisted that Britain’s alliance with Turkey ought to end and he put 
himself at the head of a protest movement which became known as the Bulgarian 
Atrocities Agitation. As R.T. Shannon described it, in less than six weeks nearly 500 
demonstrations throughout Britain expressed to the government abhorrence at the 
atrocities and forced Disraeli to consider revising his Eastern policy.33 Freeman 
composed the Ottoman Power at the height of the Crisis and attempted to use Eastern 
history to show that ‘as long as any Christian land remains under the Turk, there will 
be discontents and disturbances and revolts and massacres; there will be diplomatic 
difficulties and complications; in a word, the ‘‘eternal Eastern Question’’ will remain 
eternal’ (p. x). This history, Freeman believed, was particularly necessary  because 
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Britain was being deceived by a ‘Jewish’ Prime Minister who was naturally an 
Oriental sympathiser. 
Said’s idea that Western writers draw on an established Occidental discourse on 
the East rather than turning to original Oriental sources is instructive when 
examining Freeman’s sources for the Oriental volumes. Given the pressured 
circumstances under which he wrote, both works were composed ‘rather quickly’.34 
He worked at home with no time to study Oriental material and had been forced to 
‘get up the story [of the Saracens] how I might from a private library which had been 
collected without any special reference to the subject’.35 Similarly, the Ottoman Power 
was based on what Freeman already knew, ‘an expansion of a tract called ‘‘The Turks 
in Europe’’’ he had recently written.36 Freeman’s access to source material was 
further limited by his self-confessed lack of technical ability as an Orientalist. As he 
wrote to the historian George Finlay in September 1856: ‘I am delighted that you 
think so well of my Saracens. Mine, you know, is a purely exoteric and Western view. 
I learned a little Hebrew years back, which enables me now and then to see the 
meaning of an Arabic name; that is all my oriental scholarship.’37 The Saracens 
contains only one reference to primary Oriental material – that made to the Abu’l- 
Fida, dealing with the life of the Prophet, translated into Latin by J. Gagnier in 1723. 
The Ottoman Power contains no references to primary Oriental material. Among 
Freeman’s principal sources were two generally recognized landmarks of Oriental 
scholarship: Simon Ockley’s History of the Saracens (1708) and George Sale’s Qur’an 
with Preliminary Discourse (1734).38 Material was also drawn from modern 
Orientalist works such as Sir John Malcolm’s two-volume History of Persia (1815). 
In gathering factual information from these works Freeman imbued their Orientalist 
themes: Malcolm’s argument that Islam was a shackle to progress in the East, for 
example, is repeated in Freeman’s narratives. 
Freeman’s view of Western identity was primarily informed by his understanding 
of the Euro-Christian past, although this idea of Europe would be reinforced by an 
emphasis on the distinctiveness of the Orient. Freeman’s conception of European 
identity was deeply influenced by the teachings of Thomas Arnold who he had heard 
lecture as Professor of Modern History at Oxford in 1841 and 1842.39 Arnold 
believed that an analysis of a nation’s political institutions would reveal the inner 
stage that the nation had reached in a universal process of progress  from ‘childhood’ 
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through ‘manhood’ to ‘decay’.40 Based on the assumption that a comparative  study 
of political institutions revealed that ancient and modern nations contained primitive 
and advanced elements, Arnold rejected the traditional periodical divisions of 
‘ancient’ and ‘modern’ in history. For Arnold, nations could only be properly 
classified as ancient or modern according to the maturity of their political 
institutions and not on the basis of their chronology. Once so classified, Arnold 
believed that the unified process by which nations passed through their life-cycle 
would be revealed. This idea of unity in history was bolstered by the idea of a 
connection between the nations of the ancient and modern cyclical ages. Arnold held 
that the Greeks and Romans of the first age, and the Teutons of the second age, had 
each achieved the highest level of civilization available to them. The progress of the 
Western races was understood to be shared, not because they had inherent 
characteristics that guaranteed their development, but because the achievements of 
the ancient world had been communicated to the modern world by the close historic 
and geographic contact between Romans and Teutons. 
Freeman’s Saracens dutifully articulates an Arnoldian conception of Europe’s 
unified cultural development: 
 
In studying the records of Greece, of Rome, of medieval Europe we are studying the 
history of our own predecessors, of men and nations whose direct influence we carry 
about with us to the present day. From the days when art and civilization and freedom 
first sprung into being in their native soil of Hellas to the last event recorded by the 
contemporary chroniclers of our own stirring and eventful age, all are but links in one 
great chain . . . European history forms one great drama, which can never be thoroughly 
understood if divided by unnatural and arbitrary barriers into ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’. It 
is essentially the history of progress. (p. 1) 
 
Freeman understood Western history to form a unity based on the common 
language, habits, and institutions of European nations, on the fact that they were all 
drawn within the influence of the Roman Empire, and that they all converted to 
Christianity. In the Saracens, where Freeman sought to identify the primary cause of 
differentiation between West and East, Christianity emerges as central: ‘The 
immemorial habits of the European nations prepared them in many respects for 
the reception of the Gospel; while its character, as a system purely of religion and 
morals, was no impediment to the European mind in its career of progress’ (p. 2). 
Christianity, which lay down no political or civil precepts and allowed its followers to 
work out the best way to apply its teachings, had ensured that Europe had ‘gone on 
steadily developing for nearly three thousand years’ (p. 1). In stark contrast, Freeman 
describes how, ‘earlier as it appears in the field of history than the West, the East has 
lagged far behind the development of its rival’ (p. 3). Freeman believed that Islam 
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posed a barrier to progress and that consequently Oriental history possesses ‘a certain 
sameness and monotony which we do not find in the history of any western country’ 
(p. 4). It was for this reason that he held that ‘there are large portions of oriental 
history which are alike unprofitable and well nigh impossible, to be remembered’ 
(p. 3). ‘The mind’, Freeman asserted, ‘refuses to be burthened with the genealogies, or 
with the massacres, of the countless series of unknown princes and unknown 
dynasties which flit across the canvas in dazzling and perplexing succession’ (p. 5).  
While Freeman’s later works can be dissected for statements that suggest 
biological racism, he continued to favour a cultural explanation of human 
differentiation. In the 21 years that separated the Saracens from the Ottoman Power 
Freeman adopted the Comparative Method, pioneered in the 1860s and 1870s by 
Friedrich Max Mu¨ller and Henry Maine.41 The Comparative Method was used to 
identify similarities in the languages, myths and laws of the European nations, and to 
advance the idea that the uniformity of Western culture proved the common descent 
of each nation from an original Aryan homeland. In articulating the idea of an Aryan 
race based on linguistic and cultural homogeneity, its practitioners were careful to 
ensure that their arguments were not confused with arguments based on physiology. 
Mu¨ller maintained that ‘Aryan, in scientific language is utterly inapplicable to race. It 
means language and nothing but language’, while Maine explained persistent 
tendencies in terms of the acquisition and transmission of characteristics which might 
be modified in the course of history by a variety of social processes.42 Freeman, too, 
while convinced of the existence of an Aryan race made it clear, in his essay, 
‘Race and Language’ (1877), that the researches of the Comparative Method were to 
be distinguished from the work of those whose ‘business lies with the different 
varieties of the human body, and specially, to take that branch of his inquiries which 
most impress the unlearned, with the various conformations of the human skull’.43 
Freeman asserted that the Comparative Method focused on phenomena that 
depended on human will, not on physical laws, and pointed out that there was no 
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scientific proof that the Aryan ‘race’ was based on blood, that there may be ‘no such 
thing as race at all’ and that ‘the doctrine of race is essentially an artificial doctrine, a 
learned doctrine’.44 Similarly, in an essay on ‘The Physical and Political Bases of 
National Unity’, he described the ideal ‘pure’ nation as one ‘where a continuous 
territory is inhabited by a people united under one government, and all of them 
speaking the same language’, and underlined the fact that he was ‘satisfied with unity 
of language, and I say nothing about unity of   race’.45 
In the later Ottoman Power, Freeman’s strong conception of Europe as a cultural 
entity is reiterated and bolstered by arguments associated with the Comparative 
Method: ‘There was a time when the forefathers of all the nations of Europe . . . were 
all one people, when they marched in one common company from the common 
home far away’ (p. 4). The Aryans, having settled in lands which were geographically 
continuous, were subsequently able to add to the original tie of kinship and speech, 
the tie of common historical experience (p. 6). Despite these commonalities 
Christianity remains, for Freeman, the key to European progress. Its teachings, he 
explains, have forced development by necessitating the abolition of polygamy and 
slavery and by encouraging all European governments to continually reform ‘towards 
a system which does tolerably fair justice between man and man’ (pp. 14–15). In a 
move that sets up the Oriental ‘other’, Freeman notes ‘the Turk has no share in that 
original kindred of race and language which binds together all the European nations’ 
because, while ‘all the European nations, with the smallest exceptions, belong to 
Aryan stock . . . the Turks belong to the Turanian stock’ (p. 52). If this difference had 
stood alone, however, it would not have been enough to hinder the Turks from 
becoming European ‘by adoption’ (p. 53). ‘Here then’, Freeman explains, ‘is the great 
point which makes it altogether impossible for the Turks really to become an 
European nation. They cannot become an European nation, as long as they remain 
Mahometans’ (p. 54). For Freeman, the prevalence of Islam made it impossible for 
Muslims to adapt to European ways of life because the Qur’an bids true believers to 
fight against the infidels (p. 60). 
There are clear similarities between the Saracens and Ottoman Power, in their 
motivation, methodology and representation of the Orient as ‘other’ to the West. 
Both works were prompted by the Eastern Question, exploited a simplistic model of 
the Orient according to contemporary exigency, and drew a distinction between 
Europe and the East based primarily on religion. While the parallels are important, 
the differences are significant. The Saracens had consisted of a set of historical 
lectures and Freeman had felt that ‘it would have been obviously out of place to do 
more than point the political moral of the story in a general way’ (p. ix). Still, he 
would demonstrate that the Turks were incapable of reform because Islam hindered 
progress. The Ottoman Power, by comparison, was an overtly political work and an 
attempt by Freeman to demonstrate that the presence of the Oriental Turk within the 
bounds  of  Euro-Christendom  should  not  be  tolerated.  In  this  work,   Freeman’s 
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conception of European progress as inextricably associated with Christianity 
produces a fear of the un- and anti-Christian Orient. 
 
2. Islam and Orientalism 
Said argues that Christian antagonism towards Islam first led to the idea of the Orient 
as ‘other’ but, though traditional fears and hostilities towards the rival faith persisted 
into the modern period, these were masked behind narratives that purported to be 
secular and objective, while still bolstering imperialistic ambitions.46 In contra- 
distinction to Said, Hourani and Lewis propose that an explicit preoccupation with 
Islam continued, and even intensified in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as 
secular philosophers such as Edward Gibbon and Thomas Carlyle sought objective 
re-evaluations of Islam and theologians like F.D. Maurice tried to accommodate 
Christianity to Islam. From a different perspective, Clinton Bennett has focused on 
Victorian theological and doctrinal debates and the development of two Christian 
schools of thought on Islam: the conciliatory school, represented by Charles Forster 
and Reginald Bosworth Smith, and the reactionary, represented by Sir William Muir 
and William Tisdall.47 The Saracens does not fit neatly into any of these traditions. 
Freeman advanced an openly ‘traditional’ and ‘confrontational’ interpretation of 
Islam which shaped his account of Oriental distinctiveness. His attack was not 
motivated primarily by theological or doctrinal enquiry but by fierce political 
opposition to cultural contact between Europe and the Orient. 
Freeman’s Saracens can be compared most instructively with the writings of J.H. 
Newman. Like Freeman, Newman delivered lectures on the East in response to 
Britain’s involvement in the Crimean War which were subsequently collected and 
published as the often forgotten Historical Sketches, vol. 1, subtitled The Turks in 
Their Relation to Europe (1872).48 The confrontational attacks on Islam which are 
advanced by Freeman and Newman are almost identical and neither deviates in any 
significant way from the traditional Christian polemics of, for example, George 
Sandys   or   Humphrey   Prideaux.49    Furthermore,   both   Freeman   and  Newman 
incorporate their diatribes against Islam within a wider narrative  of  universal 
history, which assumes a form that was novel in the nineteenth century. As Arnaldo 
Momigliano has demonstrated, where traditional universal historians had empha- 
sized lines of development such as the succession of a silver age by a golden age, or 
one empire by another empire, in the nineteenth century universal historians 
‘recognized the possibility that their typology, rather than providing criteria for the 
description and classification of successive ages of mankind, would lead to the 
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partition of mankind into several co-existing groups or races, each with its own 
permanent features’.50 Freeman and Newman characterize the East as a force which 
emerged as entirely separate from Europe, because Muslim peoples and societies were 
constrained, and permanently stereotyped by, the teachings of Islam. Christianity and 
Islam subsist, for both men, as fundamentally incompatible and antagonistic forces, 
and the history of the conquests of the Saracens, which witnessed the emergence of 
Islam as a militant force that clashed with Europe on its own soil, was the primary 
vehicle through which to demonstrate this fact. Newman perceived the historic 
struggle as one between ‘Christ in the West, and Satan in the East’, between the ‘land 
of civilization and the land of barbarism’.51 Freeman explicitly approved of this view; 
‘as Dr Newman says, [the Turk’s] victories – except when gained over fellow 
Mahometans – have always been at the expense of the  Christian’.52 
The scope of Freeman’s and Newman’s lectures on the East suggests something of 
the traditional Christian attitude with which they approached Islam. Identifying Arab 
national history with the advent of Islam, both men exclude any view of Islam as a 
spiritual faith which is part of the unbreakable historical continuity of the Arabic 
peoples. This approach makes the advent of Islam appear to be a ‘surprise’ 
phenomenon that was ‘revolutionary’ in its effects, but secular rather than spiritual. 
While Carlyle had argued that Muhammad was a true Prophet and a hero, both 
Freeman and Newman entertain the idea, which did not deviate  from medieval 
norms, that the Prophet was an impostor who was driven by lust and political 
ambition to unite spiritual and temporal powers.53 Freeman believed that 
Muhammad’s ‘prosperity corrupted him’, that  his  ‘confidence  in  his  own 
teachings . . . is by no means inconsistent with some alloy of conscious imposture’ 
and that ‘he may have been open to the charge of self-delusion’ (p. 58). For Freeman, 
Muhammad is ‘that illiterate camel-driver from Mecca’, an ‘adroit and consummate 
hypocrite’, ‘a destroyer in the general history of the world’, ‘voluptuous’ and 
‘impulsive’.54 The ‘False Prophet’ is most blameworthy because, ‘he did not 
sufficiently examine into the true nature of Christianity . . . . A little more inquiry and 
Mahomet might have proved a Christian missionary.’55 In sum, he ‘was of a truth the 
very Antichrist, and his followers are justly branded with the name of Infidel’ (p. 63). 
Similarly, for Newman, Islam has no divine, revealed, or absolute status. In his 
lectures Islam appears as a ‘depraved’ religion, a ‘loose profession’ and an 
‘imposture’.56 In relation to other systems of faith Newman positions Islam 
somewhere between Paganism and Christianity, and he ascribes all Islamic doctrinal 
aspects  which  agree  with  Christian  doctrine  to  Christianity,  and  the  remaining 
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aspects to Paganism. As followers of a rival and corrupt religion, Muslims are 
portrayed as ‘tools of the Evil One, and preachers of a lie, and enemies, not witnesses 
of God’ (p. 88). 
The denial of divine revelation to Muhammad’s teachings is associated with the 
argument that the spread of Islam, as a false religion, can be due only to its use of the 
sword. Where conciliatory theologians such as Forster and Maurice doubted that the 
spread of Islam could be entirely due to the sword and pointed out that ‘signal 
examples are not lacking of [Islam] progressing among nations who never felt its 
sword’, Freeman and Newman maintain the traditional argument.57 Comparing the 
propagation of Christianity and Islam, Freeman identifies one key difference: 
 
The one is commanded to go and teach all nations; if charged to compel them to come 
in, yet that compulsion must be purely moral, for the same voice has said, that all they 
who take the sword shall perish by the sword. The other assumes that forbidden weapon 
as its chosen means of conversion; its preachers are warriors, its school of disputation is 
the field of battle. The one calls on the infidel to repent and believe, and so avoid the 
wrath to come, the other forces on him the immediate temporal alternative of ‘Koran, 
Tribute, or Sword’.58 
 
Newman asserts that violence is central to Islam and is harmonious with the Turks’ 
inherent barbarism. Islam is a religion in which ‘the soldier is the missionary, the 
soldier is the martyr also’ (p. 89). As such, Islam provided an outlet for the martial 
energies of the barbarous Turks, ‘it has given an aim to their military efforts, a 
political principle and a social bond’ (p. 73). 
In arguing that Islam was a secular revolution, Freeman and Newman contend 
that it was soon exhausted and would have been a transitory phenomenon were it not 
for the sword. This understanding of exhaustion and degeneration shaped the idea of 
the Orient as backwards and despotic. Certainly, Freeman accounts for all the 
perceived ills of Oriental society by reference to the long-term consequences of the 
teachings of the ‘insufferably dull’ Qur’an (p. 190). Even though Islam may have 
alleviated ‘the great evils of the old oriental system . . . despotism, polygamy and 
absence of law’, it is still the case that ‘none of these has Mahometanism removed 
[but] by the very fact of alleviating it has sanctioned and stereotyped them’ (pp. 67– 
68). For example, where ‘the old despots of Nineveh or Babylon knew no law but 
their own will, and recognized no responsibility to God or man, the new legitimate 
Mahometan despot claims to be the Caliph or representative of the Prophet’ (p. 68). 
Far from making the new despot more responsible, in Freeman’s view ‘it is clear that 
the institution of despotism is thereby established and consecrated’ (p. 68). 
Polygamy, ‘one of the greatest and most fearful evils in the Mahometan system’ is 
reinforced by the teaching of the Prophet: ‘This is one of the cases in which the first 
step is everything’, he writes, ‘See to how Mahomet’s own precept is observed.  His 
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followers have found it much easier to remember that he allowed four wives than that 
he allowed only four’ (pp. 53, 69). Muhammad, Freeman concludes, ‘has eventually 
done more than any mortal man to hinder the progress alike of truth and civilization. 
The religious reformer has checked the advance of Christianity; the political reformer 
has checked the advance of freedom, and indeed of organized government in any 
shape; the moral reformer has set his seal to the fearful evils of polygamy and slavery’ 
(p. 72). 
Newman similarly argues that Islam is ‘as congenial to the barbarian as 
Christianity is congenial to man civilized’ (p. 203). Islam is presented as antithetical 
to art and thereby to human creativity.59  The  Turks’ 
 
religion forbids them every sort of painting, sculpture, or engraving; thus the fine arts 
cannot exist among them . . . . They have scarcely any notion of medicine or surgery; 
and they do not allow of anatomy. As to science, the telescope, the microscope, the 
electric battery, are unknown, except as playthings. The compass is not universally 
employed in the navy, nor are its common purposes thoroughly understood. Navigation, 
astronomy, geography, chemistry, are either not known, or practised only on 
antiquated and exploded principles. (pp. 187–88) 
 
Islam paralyses the human mind and, inevitably, leads to fatalism; a misconceived 
version of submission, which, in Newman’s writings is the quintessence of barbarism 
(p. 199). 
Freeman and Newman deal with the contemporary Ottoman Empire as well as its 
history, arguing that British support of Turkish rule in South-eastern Europe is 
misguided because the Turk will never reform. ‘Full justice I trust I have done to the 
Prophet himself and the nobler among his disciples’, declares Freeman, ‘but what has 
been the result of our inquiry? That Mahometanism is essentially an obstructive, 
intolerant system’ (p. 246). There could not be a ‘sadder sight’ than the ensign of 
‘him who in deed, though not in will, has been the Antichrist’ established within the 
limits of what once was Christendom, in ‘vanished Carthage, in Alexandria, in 
Byzantium, in the Holy City itself ’ (p. 247). His most cherished hope was ‘to see the 
Cross gleaming upon the dome of St Sophia’ (p. 247). The Saracens ends with a plea 
to the reader: ‘let not the individual Christian have to recognize a Mahometan master 
as his sovereign. So long as a government remains Mahometan, so long must it be 
intolerant at home; so long will it only be restrained by weakness from offering to 
other lands the old election of ‘Koran, Tribute, or Sword’ (pp. 247–48). For Newman, 
too, the Turks are incapable of reform and their presence within Europe should not 
be tolerated because they are ‘in the way of the progress of the nineteenth century’ (p. 
222). Concerned that the Turk ‘has in its brute clutch the most famous countries of 
classical and religious antiquity’, Newman hoped the barbarians would ‘be 
surrounded, pressed upon, divided, decimated, driven into the desert by the force 
of civilization’ (p. 228). 
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3. Islam’s ‘strange secret sharer’ 
Freeman’s traditional Christian antagonism towards Islam is similarly evident in the 
Ottoman Power but the deprecating tone of the earlier work is replaced by fear of 
Turkish invasion and destruction that is heightened by Freeman’s suspicion that the 
‘Jewish’ Disraeli was conspiring with the Turks against Europe. Said first suggested a 
link between European representations of Jews and Muslims in the introduction to 
Orientalism. ‘By an almost inescapable logic’, he wrote, ‘I have found myself writing 
the history of a strange, secret sharer of Western anti-Semitism. That anti-Semitism 
and, as I have discussed it in its Islamic branch, Orientalism, resemble each other very 
closely is a historical cultural, and political truth.’60 According to Said, Euro- 
Christian representations of Islam and Judaism are alike informed by the idea of 
‘otherness’ and are associated with the European exertion of power over the Islamic/ 
Jewish Orient.61 Freeman’s account of the Jew as an ‘Asiatic in Europe’ runs parallel 
to his narrative regarding the fearful barbarity and despotism of the Turk. His ‘two 
discourses for Semites’, however, do not merely resemble each other but are 
inextricably linked, in a way which challenges Said’s understanding of modern 
Orientalism. 
As we have seen, Freeman had followed Arnold and the practitioners of the 
Comparative Method in defining the West as a community of culture, rather than 
blood. For Arnold, Max Mu¨ller, Maine and Freeman, European progress was not 
guaranteed and historic development had been cyclical rather than unilinear. Arnold 
believed that states, like individuals, went through certain stages in a certain order 
before ultimately decaying.62 Mu¨ller held that the Indo-European language  had 
grown by the two-fold laws of ‘phonetic degeneration’ and ‘dialectic regeneration’.63 
Maine, as Burrow has pointed out, advanced a status-to contract dictum which, if it 
claims to be a law, is one based on the imagery of a life cycle and historical 
successions, and it predicts the decay and death of Aryan societies.64 Basing his 
conception of race on culture rather than biology, Freeman, too, accepted that 
European historical development could be cyclical. His Comparative Politics (1873) 
fused the perspective of the new Comparative Method with a systematic exposition of 
Arnold’s philosophy of history and studied the political institutions of the Aryans 
comparatively in order to demonstrate that the civilizations of ancient Greece and 
Rome, and the civilizations of modern Europe, constituted two discrete historical 
successions in an overarching process of progress towards modern liberty.65 
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Freeman’s cultural conception of the Aryan race, his idea of an unalterable 
distinction between the West and the East based on religion, and his view of the 
cyclical nature of history, are all fundamental to an understanding of his fear of the 
Islamic East. Far from bolstering the strength and power of Europe vis-a`-vis the East 
as Said would suggest, the Islamic and Jewish ‘others’ in the Ottoman Power are 
bound together by Freeman’s explicit belief in an anti-Christian Oriental conspiracy 
which threatens the West with degeneration and   recapitulation. 
As Anthony Wohl has demonstrated, popular discontent at Disraeli’s handling of 
the Eastern Crisis focused on his perceived Jewish ethnicity and produced a virulent 
and ‘expressable’ form of anti-Semitism.66 Although Disraeli was baptized at age 13, 
his idiosyncratic writings helped to create the widespread image of the embittered 
and hostile ‘alien’.67 His response to the Bulgarian atrocities only heightened these 
suspicions as he first tried to deny the massacres had taken place – infamously 
dismissing reports of atrocities as ‘coffee house-babble’ – and then asserted they were 
of little consequence to British policy. While Disraeli’s foreign policy was 
diplomatically legitimate, many believed England’s foreign policy had been captured 
by the Jewish Disraeli and by forces antithetical to Christianity.68 Among the most 
bitterly hostile of Disraeli’s critics, Freeman consistently portrayed the Premier as a 
traitorous Oriental foreigner: ‘The charge against Lord Beaconsfield is that he has 
never become an Englishman, that he has never become an European, that  he 
remains the man of Asian mysteries, with feelings and policy distinctly Asiatic’.69 The 
preface to the Ottoman Power contains a comprehensive exposition of Freeman’s 
suspicions and prejudices regarding Disraeli: 
 
There is another power against which England and Europe ought to be yet more 
carefully on their guard. It is no use mincing matters. The time has come to speak out 
plainly . . . it will not do to have the policy of England, the welfare of Europe, sacrificed 
to Hebrew sentiment. The danger is no imaginary one. Every one must have marked 
that the one subject on which Lord Beaconsfield, through his whole career, has been in 
earnest has been whatever has touched his own people. A mocker about everything else, 
he has been thoroughly serious about this . . . we cannot sacrifice our people, the people 
of Aryan and Christian Europe, to the most genuine belief in an Asian mystery. We 
cannot have England or Europe governed by a Hebrew policy. (pp. xvii–xix) 
Disraeli, Freeman continues, ‘is the active friend of the Turk’, but the extent of ‘the 
alliance runs through all Europe . . . . Throughout the East, the Turk and the Jew are 
leagued against the Christian’ (pp. xix–xx). 
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The narrative of the rise of the Ottoman Power, of the manner in which the Turks 
infiltrated and superseded the Saracenic and Byzantine empires, is intended as a 
warning regarding the contemporary presence of the Ottomans in Europe. Freeman 
begins by demonstrating that the Saracens, like modern Europeans, were superior to 
the Turks in strength and civilization: ‘The Turks and Saracens first came to have 
dealings with one another at the moment when the Saracen dominion which the 
Turks were to supplant was at the height of its power’ (p. 89). The Saracenic Empire 
had become ‘the dwelling-place of art, science, literature and philosophy’, but it was 
this very predilection for the intellectual and the controversial that led to the decline 
of the Caliphate.70 Factions emerged within the Caliphate which claimed severally to 
be the successors of Muhammad and it was only due to such social dismemberment 
that the Turk was able to penetrate into the heart of the Empire. The declining 
Caliphate became reliant on Turkish mercenaries to such an extent that the Caliphs 
of the late Abbasid period became nominal sovereigns and the Turks emerged ‘as 
practical masters, as avowed sovereigns’ (p. 91). Freeman contrasts the Caliph’s 
nominal power with the real authority of the Seljuk Turks who pressed their 
conquests into Eastern Europe in the latter part of the eleventh century. This caused 
the Christian nations of the West to come to the help of their brethren in the East, 
but, Freeman argues, the effect of the Crusades in weakening the Seljuk Power was to 
enable the Eastern Roman Emperors to win back a great part of the land and, in 
effecting the break up of the Sultans’ dominion, they ‘paved the way for the coming 
of a mightier power of their own race’: the house of Othman (p. 95). 
Freeman would move on to the divisions of Medieval and modern Christendom 
which, in turn, promoted the success of the Turk but first he discoursed on the 
nature of the Ottomans. His account of the rise of the Ottoman Empire starts with a 
warning that ‘we must be prepared then from the very beginning to find in the 
Ottoman rulers much that is utterly repulsive to our modern standard, much that is 
cruel, much that is foul’ (p. 103). Under Othman’s son Orkhan (1326–1361) the 
Ottoman Turks first made good their footing in Europe, but while his dominion was 
still only Asiatic, Orkhan ‘began one institution which did more than anything else 
firmly to establish the Ottoman power. This was the institution of tribute children’ 
(p. 103). While writers such as James Phillpotts had described the Janissary with 
relative detachment and noted the ‘wonderful efficacy of this remarkable 
institution’,71  Freeman laments: 
The deepest of wrongs, that which other tyrants did as an occasional outrage, thus 
became under the Ottomans a settled law . . . . These children torn from their homes 
and cut off from every domestic and national tie, knew only the religion and service into 
which they were forced, and formed a body of troops such as no other power, Christian 
or Mahometan, could command. In this way the strength of the conquered nations was 
turned against themselves. (p.  104) 
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All of this is taken as evidence that ‘the Ottoman power was the power, not of a 
nation, but simply of an army’ which proceeded to ‘swallow up Greeks, Servians, and 
all other nations, bit by bit’ (p.  104). 
Throughout, Freeman is keen to provide evidence of the barbarism and 
destruction which characterized the history of the Turks. Thus Bajazet (1389–1402) 
was ‘the first to begin his reign with the murder of a brother out of cold policy’ 
(p. 111). Under his rule, ‘foul moral corruption which has ever since been the 
distinguishing characteristic of the Ottoman Turk came for the first time into its 
black prominence. Other people have been foul and depraved; what is specially 
characteristic  of  the  Ottoman  Turk  is  that  the  common  road  to  power  is  by 
the path of the foulest shame’ (p. 111). At this point, the best feature of Islam, the 
almost ascetic temperance that it teaches, passes away, and its worst features, the 
recognition of slavery, the establishment of the arbitrary right of the conqueror 
over the conquered, ‘grew into a system of wrong and  outrage  of  which  the 
Prophet himself had never dreamed’ (p. 111). Freeman narrates the advance in 
Turkish power which continued under Amurath the Second (1421–1451) and the 
events of the reign of Mahomet the Second (1444–1446 and 1451–1481). Where 
earlier writers, such as Edward Upham, admired Mahomet the Second as ‘the most 
artful, most courageous, and most persevering conqueror . . . in all respects a very 
extraordinary man’, Freeman dwells on this reign as one  in  which  ‘the  three 
abiding Ottoman vices of cruelty, lust, and faithlessness stand out’.72  By  relating 
how Mahomet overthrew the last remnants of independent Roman rule, of 
independent Greek nationality, and fixed the Northern and Western frontiers of his 
Empire, Freeman claims that the divisions of Western Christendom promoted the 
success of the Ottoman Empire. Nothing helped the Ottomans so much as 
dissensions between the Eastern and Western Churches, whose members ‘could not 
be got heartily to act with one another’ (p. 124). Freeman recalls that ‘many of the 
Greeks  said that  they  would  rather see  the Turks in  Saint Sophia  than the Latins, 
and they lived to see it. And the Latins, with a few noble exceptions, could never be 
got to give any real help to the Greeks’ (p. 124). Consequently, the Turks were able 
to thoroughly establish their dominion in     Europe. 
Freeman presents the seventeenth century as a time when Christians began to 
struggle for liberation. He condemns in high moral and Christian language the 
failure of Europe to help their brethren in the East. Thus it was now necessary ‘to 
take up the righteous cause, to undo the wrong that we have done, to wipe away 
the tears that we have made to flow, to burst asunder the chains that we ourselves 
have riveted’ (pp. 265–66). ‘Our thoughts’, Freeman urges, must ‘go back to the 
days when crusades were still crusades . . . . We should go forth with the pure zeal 
of the great assembly of Clermont; we should put the cross upon our shoulders 
with the cry of ‘God wills it’ on our lips and in our hearts’ (p. 266). Modern 
Europeans,  like  the  Saracens  and  citizens  of  the  Eastern  Roman  Empire,     are 
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superior to the Oriental Turk in many ways  but  they  are  divided  among 
themselves on religious lines and nurture a misguided antagonism to the Eastern 
Church. For Freeman, the potential danger posed to Europe by the Turk remains, 
even while their Empire declines, because Britain is allied with the Turk against 
the attempts of the South-eastern Christian nations to revolt with the aid of Orthodox 
Russia. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The conventional portrait of Freeman as a mid-Victorian historian of Britain and the 
Continent, champion of the Aryan race and confident believer in Western progress 
can be modified in view of his two neglected Oriental volumes. In direct response to 
Britain’s support of the Ottoman Empire and in attempting to demonstrate that the 
presence of the Turks within the bounds of European Christendom was intolerable, 
Freeman turned, not to Oriental source material, but to the work of authoritative 
Orientalists, and rearranged the past to represent the East as irrevocably distinct 
from, and actively hostile towards, the West. Drawing a distinction between the West 
and the East based on religion, Freeman viewed history as a panoramic struggle 
between Christianity and anti-Christian forces, from which Europe will not 
necessarily emerge victorious. While Said has argued that Western accounts of the 
Islamic and Judaic Orient reinforce and empower the European self-image, it is clear 
that Freeman’s traditional Christian anxiety regarding the rival religion underpins his 
fear of a Judeo-Islamic conspiracy. The contemporary East remained a dangerous 
threat to the West because, while Europe was superior to the Ottoman Empire in 
many ways, the divisions within Christianity and the Asiatic sympathies of European 
Jews made it vulnerable to invasion. Consequently, Freeman urged a cultural and 
geographical separation of Muslims and Christians. 
Freeman’s volumes on the East suggest the complexity of Victorian 
representations of Islam that must be viewed in their specific historical contexts. 
The overall trend in late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century approaches to Islam was 
undoubtedly one of increasingly positive and objective reappraisal. While secular 
philosophers such as Gibbon and Carlyle acknowledged Islam as a valid faith which 
ought to be respected, ‘conciliatory’ theologians discoursed on the merits of the rival 
system and sought to overturn the traditional critiques of the ‘confrontational’ 
school. Nevertheless, it is clear that at moments of direct engagement with the Islamic 
East Victorians could draw on convenient medieval stereotypes and crusading 
rhetoric to denounce British foreign policy. While Freeman and Newman appear to 
have been among a small minority combining anti-Islamism and political protest in 
the 1850s, such fusing of political and religious perspectives was characteristic of the 
public reaction to the crisis of the 1870s. As paranoia about Oriental conspiracies 
overwhelmed earlier fears of the Russian bear, Freeman was foremost among those 
producing negative portrayals of Jews and Muslims. That his writings now found a 
receptive audience and that he frequently acted as a keynote speaker at anti-Turk 
meetings points to fluidity in nineteenth-century perceptions of Islam, a point that 
has not been adequately acknowledged. 
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